Following the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by a US-led coalition of forces, the regime of Saddam Hussein rapidly collapsed and coalition forces took control of the country. Despite the rapid and relatively bloodless victory, chaos, looting, crime, an anti-occupation insurgency, sectarian violence, and terrorism emerged in Iraq in subsequent years. Violence in Iraq continued even after the Coalition Provisional Authority handed over sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government in June 2004, and after elections and a constitutional referendum were held in 2005. Calls for withdrawing immediately from Iraq emerged as early as the end of 2003. In February 2006, these calls became particularly acute as the bombing of a Shi'ia mosque in Samarra plunged the country into what some have called civil war. Partly in response to this sectarian violence, the United States initiated a troop "surge" in January 2007, which appears to have reduced violence and increased stability. This has provided supporters of the war with some evidence in support of the continuation of the war. But, with 2008 marking the fifth year of the war and over 4,000 coalition troops dead, and with no clear end to the war in sight, calls for a staged withdrawal from Iraq continue to be voiced.
The debate over withdrawing troops from Iraq can be framed in general terms. Those that advocate for an "early" withdrawal desire a withdrawal before the "conditions" allow for it or before "success" is achieved (they typically object to the premise that "success" is possible). Democrats that call for a "responsible withdrawal" can be said to fall within this camp; the objective being to withdrawal before the "conditions" on-the-ground are met (under the assumption that they cannot be bet), but doing so "responsibly" so as to minimize any damages resulting from such a withdrawal. A timetable withdrawal could also be seen to fall within the pro case in this article, as it does not necessarily correlate to the achievement of desired on-the-ground "successes" and "conditions". The con case calls for the continuation of the war until on-the-ground "conditions" are met and "success" achieved. The below debate is, therefore, a reflection of the general principles and arguments being leveled in this debate. Should the war be ended before the desired "conditions" are met or should it be maintained until they are "successfully" achieved? While this article documents this umbrella debate, it is important to recognize that there are many more specific debates on specific proposals that the below arguments do not address.
To answer the primary question in this debate, additional questions need to be posed. Is the Iraq War illegal under international law? Did it violate the principle that wars can only be conducted in self-defense in the UN charter? Did the UN actually not provide authorization for the war? Was the UN's inspections resolutions and Iraq's failed compliance insufficient grounds for a war? If so, does that mean that the US must withdraw immediately? Even if the war is not illegal, do the false premises of the war (that Iraq had WMD) mean that there is no longer a sufficient justification for the war's continuation? Or, having "achieved" the central justifications for the war - ending Saddam Hussein's regime and ensuring that Iraq has no WMD - can and should the US leave? Is the current war different than it was initially envisioned and might such "mission creep" justify withdrawing sooner than later? Is it necessary for the current course of the war to receive the legitimacy of US Congressional re-authorization and possibly a supportive UN resolution as well? If these can't be obtained, is the US executive office bound to withdraw immediately? Or, has the US Congress continually authorized the war through funding approvals? And, can UN resolutions be replaced by treaties negotiated directly between the United States government and the Iraqi government?
What about the broad strategic interests of the United States? Is the continued prosecution of the War in Iraq outside of these interests? Is it contrary to the interests of coalition nations and the world in general? Is it a distraction from the broader War on Terror? Does it drain resources from other, perhaps more important endeavors, such as domestic programs or the fight against global poverty and disease?
If we assume, for the sake of argument, that the War in Iraq is important and a strategic use of resources, we need to move onto other questions. Is it impossible to "succeed"? Is it impossible to "succeed" in achieving the kinds of "conditions" that would allow for a succesful, democratic, stable Iraq after a US withdrawal? Is "failure" imminent? Have coalition forces made negative, negligible, or insufficient progress in Iraq toward its its objectives and benchmarks toward a measure of "success"? Is the anti-occupation insurgency thriving or is progress being made in this fight? Is sectarian violence continuing at un-mitigated levels or has progress been made here? Is Al Qaeda growing in strength with few signs of progress in the battle against them or has progress been made? Are coalition forces actually inciting violence and part of the problem in each of these various fronts or are they an important factor in stabilizing Iraq? Has political progress in Iraq been inadequate? Is this the most important question involved here? If Iraq requires a political rather than a military solution, is political process and reconciliation failing? What about economic progress? Is this essential, and has this failed to sufficiently materialize? In general, is democracy possible in Iraq? If "success" is impossible, is an early withdrawal simply the lesser of evils? In general, is chaos, civil war, and an Iraqi failed state inevitable, making an early withdrawal the lesser of evils?
What would be the consequences of withdrawing from Iraq before conditions are met? Would it entail mild and tolerable consequences or would it be disastrous? Much of the answer to this question revolves around a previous question regarding whether coalition forces are part of the problem or the solution? Of course, if they are part of the problem, withdrawing them could be beneficial? But if they are truly part of the solution, withdrawing them could be disastrous? Would withdrawing coalition forces end the anti-occupation cause of the insurgency, subsequently ending the insurgency? Or, would the insurgency then have free reign to direct its energies against the budding Iraqi government? Is it wrong to believe that US troops are important in holding sectarian groups apart? Could an early coalition withdrawal from Iraq avoid allowing a civil war? Could it avoid causing a genocide? And, what about Al Qaeda and terrorists in Iraq? Is it wrong to believe that, if coalition forces withdrew early, that Al Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorists would be better off, possibly establishing basis from which they would launch attacks against the United States and other Western countries? Is it wrong to believe that an Islamist caliphate would result? Is it wrong to be concerned about the Kurds seeking independence and a civil war breaking out between them and Iraqi Arabs and the central Iraqi government? Would withdrawing help constrain Iranian influence or would it actually strengthen Iran's influence in Iraq and in the region? In general, would a withdrawal from Iraq be better for democracy on a global scale? Or would it result in the collapse of a budding democracy in Iraq and the establishment of an Islamist state? Would an early withdrawal cause a regional "domino effect" with the democratic experiment failing across the Middle East as a result.
Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that the consequences of a coalition withdrawal would be worse for Iraqis than the status quo? Do coalition forces have a responsibility to Iraqis to stay in Iraq to avoid such calamity? Having invaded Iraq and created many of the current problems, can coalition forces turn their backs on some kind of a responsibility to "clean up the mess" or at least minimize the damage? Do broader coalition responsibilities domestically and in the world outweigh these responsibilities to Iraq and Iraqis?
Would withdrawing from Iraq be a responsible use of coalition soldiers or is staying the course an important way to honor the sacrifices of both dead and living soldiers? What has the cost been on US and coalition militaries? Is withdrawing essential to maintaining the integrity and future of the US military? What are the broader costs of the war? Has it been a terrible economic burden on the United States? Has it severely damaged domestic programs in the United States? Has it been a major cause of economic difficulties in the states? Would an early withdrawal stimulate the US and global economies?
Finally, what does the American public want? What do Congressmen want as representatives of American will? Must their will be followed? What do the Iraqis want? While Americans may be opposed to the war, does that mean they would support an early withdrawal? What does their government want as the representatives of their peoples? Does their desire for the United States to establish a timetable for withdrawing have to be followed? What do publics around the world want? Does their will have to be followed? Would UN opposition to the war create the necessity that coalition forces withdraw immediately or on a timetable?
Certainly, this is one of the most important and complicated debates so far in the 21st century. It would appear that the Bush administration plans to stay the course through the end of its presidency in January 20th, 2009. This debate, therefore, appears most relevant to the next president of the United States, who will have to make a choice between these diverging courses of action.
Legitimacy: Was the invasion of Iraq illegal/illegitimate? Is continuing it illegal/illegitimate?
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Yes
The invasion of Iraq was illegal, making a withdrawal necessary"Iraq war illegal, says Annan". BBC. September 16th, 2007 - "When pressed on whether he viewed the invasion of Iraq as illegal, he said: 'Yes, if you wish. I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter from our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal.'" There are two basic justifications for this claim. First, the UN charter only allows for self-defensive wars in cases where the threat is imminent. The threat was not imminent in Iraq's case. Second, exceptions to self-defensive wars require UN approval through Security Council resolutions. No explicit authorization was provided by the UN to the US and coalition forces to wage war. UN resolutions only mentioned "serious consequences" in the event of Iraqi non-compliance with inspectors. "Serious consequences" is certainly not the terminology used by the UN to authorize war; "all necessary means" are the keywords that authorize war, and they were not provided in any UN resolution. Thus, the war was illegal and coalition forces have no legal basis for continued operations in Iraq.
The US tried and failed to secure a UN Security Council authorization for war. The US actively attempted to pass a UN SC resolution authorizing the invasion of Iraq. When it discovered that it could not secure enough votes, it withdrew its resolution from the floor. It proceeded with the invasion despite not receiving this authorization, and justified the invasion on the grounds of previous resolutions. But, of course, it knew that this was far less legitimate under international law than receiving an authorization that was relevant to the circumstances. That the Bush administration proceeded despite not receiving a fresh authorization speaks to its disregard for international law and legitimacy.
US justifications for war in Iraq were faulty, making a continued occupation baseless. America and its allies should never have invaded Iraq in the first place. Claims that Saddam Hussein was linked to Al-Qaeda, and that he possessed weapons of mass destruction have both turned out to be incorrect, at best, and lies at worse. The war was an illegal act of aggression, without United Nations sanction, and the occupation is therefore also illegal. For this reason alone the coalition should remove its forces from Iraq as soon as possible.
The Iraq War will be illegal after UN authorizations expire on January 1, 2009 The UN has authorized the continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq. But, if it lets its current authorization expire on January 1, 2009 - as it is scheduled to - than it will have fully lost authorization and international legal legitimacy in Iraq, and should leave.
Congress authorized the war for objectives that no longer exist The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) in 2002 was for the removal of Saddam Hussein from office and the elimination of the supposed WMD threat. Both objectives have been "accomplished", which means that the war no longer enjoys congressional authorization and approval. Without such authorization, the war, in its current form, lacks the added legitimacy provided by Congressional consultation and approval. While this alone may not be enough to end the war, the lack of Congressional approval is a major strike against it.
The 2001 Congressional "war on terror" resolution does not authorize the Iraq War The Bush administration has cited the "war on terror" legislation passed by the United States Congress weeks after the September 11th attacks as having warranted war in Iraq. But this legislation cannot be viewed as a blank check. While it offered the executive branch the authority to use "all necessary means" to protect the United States from terrorism, this cannot be interpreted to have included an authorization to invade Iraq, which posed no clear terrorism threat.
First, there must be a clear and unequivocal duty on Iraq to comply with council resolutions. Second, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of that duty. Third, there must be a legitimate and continuing authority for enforcing those actions. All are present."
Iraq never disarmed after Kuwait, inviting the use of force Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the UN-mandated, US-led expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, the UN passed resolution 687, which called for Iraq to disarm its WMD stockpiles, or face enforcement by "all necessary means". At the time of the decision to go to war in 2002, Iraq was believed to have not disarmed its WMD stockpiles. The 2003 invasion, therefore, could be justified on the basis of Iraq's non-compliance with resolution 687 and that resolution's mandate for enforcement via "all necessary means".
That Iraq did not actually have WMD highlights bad intelligence, not illegal acts. Many intelligence reports and expert opinions internationally corroborated the analysis that Iraq had WMD prior to the 2003 invasion. Leaders and governments cannot be held legally culpable for having trusted for this bad intelligence and analysis. This means that the invasion of Iraq was not really illegal nor that withdrawing from Iraq should be encouraged on such a basis.
The UN continually concluded that Iraq was breaching its disarmament obligations The UN repeatedly noted Iraq's non-compliance with its disarmament obligations through the 90s, and authorized the use of force on a number of occasions. Prior to the 2003 invasion, UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix concluded that Iraq continued to shirk compliance, and that it continued to have stores of WMD. The invasion could be justified on these grounds; continued non-compliance and past authorizations for the use of force.
Post-invasion UN resolutions authorized the presence of coalition forces in Iraq. While there may be some questions regarding the legal justifications for the invasion of Iraq, there is no question that the UN has provided resolutions authorizing the post-invasion presence of coalition forces in Iraq. On January 1, 2009, the last UN resolution providing this authorization will expire. The United State will likely seek an additional resolution to extend into 2009 and beyond. The point here is that a continuum of UN resolutions have provided continual legitimacy to the presence of coalition forces in Iraq. They also override any argument that the Iraq War is illegal based on the lack of a UN resolution; subsequent UN authorization has been provided. There is, therefore, no justification for withdrawing on the basis of a lack of UN resolutions.
The Iraq war was fully justified at the time of the decision based on the evidence. Saddam Hussein's brutal regime did pose a threat to regional stability and to its own people. Whether he actually had weapons of mass destruction is irrelevant - he acted to obstruct and deceive inspectors and so was a general menace to international law and security.
Saddam Hussein would have re-started Iraq's WMD program some-day. The evidence suggests that if sanctions had been lifted and no action taken, Saddam Hussein would have restarted Iraq's WMD programs. His memoirs indicate, at least, that he had such a desire.
The Iraq war is justified by events; the world is safer. Saddam Hussein is out of power and no longer a shadowy hazard and menace to the region. It is no longer possible for Saddam Hussein to re-build Iraq's WMD. Iraq now has the opportunity to grow into a democratic state, if it chooses. These are welcome developments, despite the costs of the war.
The US has to make the best of Iraq irrespective of faulty justifications going in. While the justifications can be debated until the cows come home, the reality in Iraq and the US presence there must be addressed at face value. Actions now must be based on considerations of the best interests of the United States, Iraq, the region, and the world at large. Any withdrawal that is based purely on the legal justifications going into the war would turn a blind eye to the present moral considerations, and would thus be amoral and possibly immoral.
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Pro/con videos
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Yes
Barack Obama on withdrawing from Iraq. March 19th, 2008[1]
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No
John McCain warning against withdrawing from Iraq. March 7th, 2008[2]
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Democracy: Will a withdrawal be better for democracy in the world?
The domino theory relies on a highly questionable notion of Iraq turning Islamist. The domino theory depends on the premise that, if the US withdraws, Iraq will turn into an Islamist country, which will then cause other countries to become increasingly Islamist. But, it is a highly questionable notion that Iraq would turn into an Islamist country after a US withdrawal. This depends on Iraq first turning into a failed state and its democratic government crumbling, which is questionable, and then Islamism becoming the dominant political force in the country such that it would influence other countries to adopt Islamism, which are also both highly questionable premises.
We should trust that democracy will appeal to Muslims no matter what happens in Iraq. To argue that the success of democracy in the Middle East and in the Muslim world depends on the results of the Iraq War, is to argue that democracy does not have its own inherent appeal. Democracy is, rather, the inherently best form of governance in the world. We must trust, therefore, that the Middle East and Muslims will come to adopt it for this reason, and irrespective of what happens in Iraq.
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No
Withdrawing early will destroy the democratic potential of Iraq Iraq has great potential to become a bastion of democracy and secularism in the Middle East. Withdrawing early jeopardizes this historic opportunity. It would also, therefore, undermine the spread of democracy in the Middle East generally.
Withdrawing prematurely from Iraq would result in democracies in the region falling like dominoesArdalan Hardi. "Leaving Iraq, a Catastrophe to U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East". KurdNet. June 4th, 2007 - "Those who advocate a quick withdrawal without offering a realistic solution to the crises seem to over look the consequences of the future U.S. national interest and the possibilities of an all-out regional war with a domino affect that will eventually draw us back into a larger war with no credibility.
Finally, if we fail in Iraq, it will be the biggest blow to the prospect of democracy in the Middle East with major political consequences in the future of our foreign policy in that region. Muslim fanatics and al-Qaeda groups will claim victory and will use our failure to increase their presence in the region."
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Broad strategy: Is a continuation of the War in Iraq contrary to US/coalition interests?
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Yes
The Iraq War has damaged US international security leverage in the world Some argue that withdrawing from Iraq would cause the United States to be seen as feckless. It is the reverse. The US is seen as feckless because it is hamstrung in Iraq. In fact, the US is actually feckless because it is tied down and exhausting itself in Iraq. The reality of fecklessness that results from the US being in Iraq is more damaging to US leverage than the impression of fecklessness, which may or may not result from withdrawing from Iraq. Withdrawing from Iraq would fix the bigger problem - the reality of fecklessness - and cut the losses of US leverage internationally.
Our continuing presence in Iraq feeds the insurgency and gives the insurgents a certain legitimacy in the eyes of much of the world. We know from our own history that armies of occupation are seldom welcome."
The Iraq War has hamstrung US Middle East policy Not only has Iraq drained US resources and military capacity, but it has also dominated its diplomatic and policy attention. It is difficult for the United States to launch any major Middle East policy initiatives, for instance in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, while it is focusing so squarely on the War in Iraq.
The world wants the US to withdraw from Iraq and would support its decision to do so. The vast majority of the world publics and leaders desire that the United States leave Iraq. If the United States made the choice to leave, the world and its leaders would mostly support its decision (it's what they are calling for!). The US could be seen as working within the wishes of the global community, and this could do nothing but increase the image of the United States in the world, as opposed to undermining US credibility and image.
Torturous and brutal tactics in Iraq have only worsened US moral credibility. Outrage at foreign occupation has been multiplied by brutal American tactics, from the use of degrading torture at Abu Ghraib to the recent discovery that phosphorus weapons were used against civilians in Fallujah. Instances American soldiers at roadblocks shooting men, women and children has also undermined the image of the United States. Indeed, counter-insurgency occupations are ugly and gruesome incidence, which will inevitably undermine the image of the US, cannot be avoided.
The US has accomplished its limited strategic objectives in Iraq, so it can leave. Saddam has been removed from office and executed, WMD has not been found, and Iraq is no longer a threat to the region. This was the main thrust of the US mission going into the war. Having accomplished these objectives and having ensured that Iraq in fact does not have WMD, the US can withdrawal on the basis that it has accomplished its limited mission in Iraq.
The US is subjecting itself to "imperial overstretch" in Iraq This is a classic phenomena with great powers, in which they engage in unnecessary wars at far greater cost than was ever initially imagined, leading to the weakening of the state and a fall from grace. This has happened many times in history, it can certainly happen again, with Iraq as the catalyst for the fall of the United States.
A policy of "containing" fundamentalism would successfully follow withdrawing from Iraq. The policy of "containment" in the Cold War was a success. The idea was to contain the influence of communism while promoting the greater idea of democracy. This succeeded. In the Middle East, a policy of "containing" Islamic fundamentalism should be implemented, while simultaneously promoting the greater idea of democracy and secularism. This will succeed too.
The Iraq War has decreased oil production in Iraq rather than secured it Invading Iraq was - at least with nods and winks - secure US and coalition oil interests in a country with the second to third largest oil reserves in the world. It, however, has not done so, and has resulted in the greatest oil-price hikes in decades. For sure this justification for invading was faulty. It may also be true that withdrawing would help re-stabilizing global oil prices. This is based, in large part, on combination of cases that withdrawing from Iraq will not cause greater chaos and that it may actually improve the situation (below).
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No
Enemies of the US would view an early withdrawal from Iraq as a sign of fecklessness A coalition withdrawal from Iraq would be seen as a sign of weakness. Smelling blood, terrorists would fight harder. Enemies of the Coalition would take the threat of US forces less seriously. Generally, the United States would be seen as weaker and treated so geopolitically.
Iraq is a pillar of American strategy in the Middle East that should not be abandonedSenator John McCain, April 2008 - "The fact is, we now have a great opportunity, not only to bring stability and freedom to Iraq, but to make Iraq a pillar of our future strategy for the entire region of the greater Middle East."[3] If Iraq is turned into a functioning democracy, and economically viable state, and an ally of Western democracies, it would become a primary conduit for all US and Western relations in the Middle East. It could become a bastion of international trade and individual property rights, and would act as a beacon of Western democratic principles in the Middle East. In a Middle East without these principles, a succesful Iraq that would serve these purposes would be priceless. While hopes should be tempered by reality in this regard, it is important to also the real importance that such an outcome would have to the future of the Middle and the world generally.
If the US withdraws early from Iraq, it will have to return to fight againJohn McCain. April, 2008 - "Some would withdraw regardless of the consequences. Others say that we can withdraw now and then return if trouble starts again. What they are really proposing, if they mean what they say, is a policy of withdraw and re-invade. I can hardly imagine a more imprudent and dangerous course."[4]
A premature US withdrawal would jeopardize world oil supplies If chaos ensues in Iraq, the risk is not simply that a civil war, genocide, and perhaps a regional conflict ensue. The added risk is that the main source of the world's oil becomes embroiled in this conflict, and that global oil prices spike significantly, shocking the global economy and causing a global recession.
Withdrawing would be counter to US and allied oil-interests in Iraq. The US and its allies, having invested so much into Iraq, should reap the benefits of Iraq's oil reserves. Benefiting from these oil reserves, with contracts and preferred relations with Iraqi suppliers, is important to US and coalition interests.
Succeeding in Iraq will help justify the war and those who supported it. Getting out too soon will simply reinforce the views of those who thought the invasion wrong in the first place. On the other hand, staying in Iraq to secure peace, democracy and human rights will set a positive example to other countries and show that the values for which the war was publicly fought were genuine; to spread democracy with conviction and determination.
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Vietnam comparison: Is Iraq another Vietnam? Would this mean leave or stay?
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Yes
The "domino theory" in a post-Iraq-withdrawal Middle East is as illegitimate as it was with Vietnam Many argue that if coalition forces withdraw prematurely from Iraq that Iraq will fall subject to Islamism and tyranny and that, in a domino effect, so too will other Middle Eastern countries fall. This was predicted by proponents of the Vietnam War; that communism would infiltrate Vietnam if the US withdrew and subsequently infiltrate the entire region in a domino-like way. Yet, this did not happen after the US withdrawal from Vietnam. None of the region's nations subsequently became communist (except for Cambodia), and most of them enjoy democratic systems today with booming economies. With this as an example, it would appear false to claim that a US withdrawal from Iraq would result in a domino-like effect in the Middle East. Rather, it is likely that these countries' political systems will remain largely insulated from any political occurrences in Iraq.
The death toll following the US withdrawal from Vietnam was not bad While hundreds of thousands, and even millions, of people died in Vietnam and Cambodia after the US withdrew, hundreds of thousands and even millions died while the US was there too. The same could be expected in Iraq. Whether we stay or go, hundreds or thousands of people are probably going to die. So, as difficult as it may be, we should go.
Withdrawing from Vietnam did not undercut US credibility and it won't in Iraq either Opponents of withdrawing from Vietnam in the late 60s and early 70s almost all argued that it would damage US credibility in the international arena. And yet, this is not what happened after the withdrawal. Instead, the United States continued to rise in power and influence around the world, with an economy and military that was no longer encumbered by the Vietnam war. It geopolitical strength increased, and thus so too did its geopolitical credibility and leverage increase. These lessons should be applied to Iraq.
Success in the Middle East will be achieved like in South East Asia; despite withdrawing US analysts feared withdrawing from Vietnam on the basis that it would undermine the future of US policies in South East Asia. Nevertheless, withdrawing did not lead to the failure of US policies in South East Asia, and some even believe it was necessary to its great successes. Similarly, many analysts fear that withdrawing from Iraq will lead to chaos in the Middle East. Yet, following the history of withdrawing from Vietnam, withdrawing would not appear to jeopardize US Middle East policies, and it may actually help them.
The truth is: America’s departure from Vietnam meant death, torture and imprisonment for millions of Vietnamese and Cambodians. Both contries became communist — which is hardly a good thing.
In my view, America’s withdrawal from Vietnam was the biggest tragedy of American foreign policy during the last century. America’s withdrawal from Vietnam is a gigantic black mark on America’s history."
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"Success": Is "success" in Iraq impossible, making withdrawal necessary?
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Yes
It is not credible anymore to claim that success is possible "this time" At every stage of the War in Iraq, from 2003 through 2008, "changes of strategy" have been held out as the kernel of hope toward achieving "success" "just around the corner". Each time, however, "changing" the strategy has failed to bring coalition forces noticeably closer to "success" in Iraq. Things have, rather, steadily worsened. New claims that "strategic changes" will, "this time", make the difference no longer have any credibility, and need to be shut out on this basis. The main problem is that no strategic changes can alter the fundamentals of the conflict (below).
No strategic changes in Iraq can alter the fundamental impossibilities of the conflict. The fundamentals of the Iraq conflict cannot be resolved by strategic adjustments. These fundamentals are: a counter-insurgency war, anti-American Iraqis that support insurgents, sectarian hatreds, an endless flood of Jihadi terrorists into Iraq, the difficulties of urban warfare, the lack of sufficient numbers of US troops, and a host of other factors. No strategic changes can affect these fundamental problems. We should not be fooled, therefore, by claims of "strategic changes" holding the key to success "this time". And, with no prospect for "strategic modifications" making success possible, the United States and coalition forces should leave.
"Success" in Iraq is impossible so withdrawal should come sooner than later While failure in Iraq is unlikely to arise, it is also unlikely that the US will "win" or that any measure of "success" will ever arise. This is encapsulated by Gen. David Petraeus's observation that "there is no light at the end of the tunnel that we're seeing."[5] This was precisely the situation that arose in Vietnam, in which a war was prolonged that would see neither victory nor defeat. It simply went on and on with no real purpose until the United States was tired and exhausted. The US must realize that it has entered a no-win situation that will simply drain it of its resources and for no clear or achievable goals, and that withdrawing sooner than later is simply the lesser of two evils.
Historically, "victory" in offensive occupations is nearly impossible While military interventions have succeeded, almost never have they succeeded where they were "offensive". The reason is that such wars deeply offend the nationalistic pride of native population and create the passions for an endless resistance effort.
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No
Success in Iraq is possible, as is evidenced by the succesful "surge" Success will not come quickly or easily. However, it is possible. It is being made possible by the brave men and women in our armed forces. Leaving will only hinder the success that we have made with the "surge".
The coalition can succeed in Iraq with more fine tunings of its strategy The troop surge is certainly an encouraging sign. But, its success must also be placed in the context of a broader adjustment in strategy that complimented the increase in troops. This has included more "forward bases" in which US troops are placed among Iraqis and Iraqi Security Forces, increasing interaction, trust, and training. It has also included the realization that much of Iraq's insurgents fight for economic reasons. Paying Iraqis to join Iraqi Security forces, therefore, is something that has been initiated to a much greater extent in Iraq in 2007 and 2008, with signs of success. These kinds of strategic adjustments and fine-tunings are taking place constantly, and make "success" a real possibility.
Given the investment the US has made in Iraq, it cannot give up now. The United States has invested trillions of dollars into the Iraq War. It is important to achieve a return on that investment, instead of throwing it all away by withdrawing.
You cannot ignore the problems involved in the War in Iraq and hope they will go away. Am example of this was Neville Chamberline in WW2. He came back from Berlin, after talking to Hitler, and said he had secured "Peace of are time." The next few days go by and Hitler invades the rest of Czechloslovakia. Then he goes and invades Poland, and WW2 happened. You cannot ignore a problem and hope it will go away! The United States needs to stay focused on the problem in Iraq (Islamic Fundamentalism), as it is central to both its Middle East strategy and the war on terror. It needs to confront the problem now, succeed now, and not delay success into the future where it will come at a greater cost.
Americans are increasingly optimistic about the prospects for success in Iraq. A Pew Research Centre March 2008 poll found that 53 percent of Americans believed "the US will ultimately succeed in achieving its goals", up from 42 per cent six months prior to the poll.[6]
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